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THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE IN LIGHT OF
HOSTILE MEDIA PERCEPTION
By R. Trevor Hall t & James C. Phillipsl
I. INTRODUCTION
In ancient mythology the fabled phoenix dies and then emerges once again
from the ashes. The resurrection of the Fairness Doctrine from the ashes of
oblivion to a hot button issue in 2008 is one of the most astounding accounts in
broadcast regulation. For decades, U.S. broadcast policy held inviolate the no-
tion of forced message parity, a sort of censorship in reverse. Broadcast sta-
tions were required to provide opposing views of a given debate. A court case
and a deregulatory-minded Federal Commissions Commission ("FCC")
changed all that in the 1980s when it discontinued the policy. Despite various
feeble attempts to revive the Fairness Doctrine, it remained quite lifeless for
the next two decades. Then in 2007, murmurs of resurrecting the Fairness Doc-
trine began to once again receive some serious consideration.
The Fairness Doctrine was the name given to a two-fold duty the FCC re-
quired of broadcasters from the 1940s through most of the 1980s. The first part
demanded that broadcasters devote a reasonable amount of time to important
public issues. The second part required fair coverage to provide opportunities
for the presentation of contrasting views.' The Fairness Doctrine was repealed
during the deregulatory period of the Reagan Administration, relegating the
concept to near irrelevance. Although this policy was abandoned over 20 years
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of Public Issues, 39 Fed. Reg. 26372 (July 18, 1974).
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ago, recent statements by public officials reasonably suggest that some have
optimistic hopes that the doctrine will rise again.2
Any discussion on the possible resurrection of the Fairness Doctrine should
address the phenomena of hostile media perception ("HMP"). Hostile media
perception refers to the observed phenomenon in which individuals perceive
the media to be biased towards their viewpoint. This bias is prevalent with both
conservative and liberal audiences. Much of the literature regarding HMP fo-
cuses on the question of press bias. This paper argues that this same phenome-
non would also have implications if the Fairness Doctrine were ever rein-
stated. More specifically, due to HMP, viewers would merely discount any
additional views resulting from enforcement of a "fairness doctrine" as media
bias, neutralizing the intended effects of the Fairness Doctrine. Such a policy
change would result in the additional cost of enforcement with little-to-no per-
ceivable benefit to the public interest.
Part II introduces the Fairness Doctrine and provides a brief history. It then
examines some of the problems involved with the original Fairness Doctrine
comprising both constitutional and practical quandaries. Part III provides an
overview of HMP. Part IV discusses the implications HMP has for any re-
newed calls for a fairness policy.
II. THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE: BACKGROUND
Given its controversial development and abundance of detractors, the likeli-
hood of a serious revival of the Fairness Doctrine at one time seemed doubtful
at best.' Yet, until the 2010 midterms, revived political winds pointed toward
such a possibility. Historically, Democrats have been seen as the strongest ad-
2 See, e.g., Robert M. McDowell, Comm'nr, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Address at the
National Religious Broadcasters Capitol Hill Summit (Sept. 4, 2009) [hereinafter McDowell
Address] (commenting on achieving the original doctrine's "viewpoint balancing objective
through a different route."); Her Royal Fairness, THE AMERICAN SPECTATOR (May 14, 2007,
12:09 AM), http://spectator.org/archives/2007/05/14/her-royal-fairness (noting that prior to
the 2008 Congressional elections, Democrat leaders Nancy Pelosi and Steny Hoyer pro-
claimed that they would "aggressively pursue reinstatement of the . . . Fairness Doctrine");
Alexander Bolton, GOP Preps for Talk Radio Confrontation, THE HILL, June 27, 2007,
http://thehill.com/homenews/news/12407-gop-preps-for-talk-radio-confrontation (quoting
Senator Dick Durbin (D-Ill.) as saying "It's time to reinstitute the Fairness Doctrine . . . I
have this old-fashioned attitude that when Americans hear both sides of the story, they're in
a better position to make a decision.").
3 See Josh Silver & Marvin Ammori, FREE PRESS, THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE
DISTRACTION 3-4 ( 2009), http://www.freepress.net/files/fp-FairnessDoctrine.pdf (providing
a brief history of the political arguments between Democrats and Republicans since Con-
gress repealed the Fairness Doctrine in 1987).
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vocates for the Fairness Doctrine.' With 2006 witnessing the election of a De-
mocratic Congress, and the 2008 presidential election resulting in a Democ-
ratic White House, conservatives grew increasingly concerned that nothing
stood in the way of bringing back the Fairness Doctrine.' In June 2007, the
Center for American Progress, a progressive think tank headed by John Pode-
sta,' released a report called, The Structural Imbalance of Political Talk Radio,
which argued for a revival of broadcast content regulation to address the gap
between the success of conservative talk radio and failure of liberal talk radio.
President Obama's assurances that he did not plan to reinstate the Fairness
Doctrine' did little to quiet such suspicion.' While the primary opponents of
4 See DONALD J. JUNG, THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, THE BROADCAST
INDUSTRY, AND THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE 1981-1987 (Univ. Press, 1996) (tracing the history
of the Fairness Doctrine in Congress and the Courts); see also Fairness in Broadcasting Act
of 1987, H.R. 1934, 100th Cong., (1987); Fairness and Accountability in Broadcasting Act,
H.R. 501, 109th Cong. (2005); Media Ownership Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 3302, 109th
Cong. (2005).
5 See Press Release, Representative John Boehner, Boehner Responds to Speaker Pe-
losi's Endorsement of So-Called "Fairness" Doctrine (June 25, 2008) [hereinafter Boehner
Press Release] (available at
http://johnboehner.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentlD=95304) (address-
ing former Speaker Nancy Pelosi's (D-CA) calls to reinstate the Fairness Doctrine); Dan
Fletcher, A Brief History of the Fairness Doctrine, TIME, Feb. 20, 2009,
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1880786,00.html (reporting that in 2009,
"'more than 20 years" after the demise of the Fairness doctrine, "a group of democratic legis-
lators are calling for it to be brought back to life."). See also 2 CONG. REC. S9070-71 (daily
ed. July 12, 2007) (statement of Sen. James Inhofe) (co-sponsoring an amendment to pro-
hibit implementation of the Fairness Doctrine); 2 CONG. REC. S8788 (daily ed. July 9, 2007)
(statement of Sen. James Inhofe), 2 CONG. REC. H5487 (daily ed. June 18, 2008) (statement
of Rep. Pence) (explaining that "while some of the most powerful Democrats in Congress
make plans to restore this Depression-era regulation, Republicans have taken action. . . The
Broadcaster Freedom Act . . . would take the power to restore the Fairness Doctrine away
from this or any future President .... ); cf Broadcaster Freedom Act of 2007, H.R. 2905,
110th Cong. (2007); S. 1748, 110th Cong. (2007).
6 About the Center for American Progress, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS,
http://www.americanprogress.org/aboutus (last visited May 14, 2011).
7 THE CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS & FREE PRESS, THE STRUCTURAL IMBALANCE
OF POLITICAL TALK RADIO (June 22, 2007), available at
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2007/06/pdf/talk radio.pdf.
8 Chris Good, White House: Obama Opposes Fairness Doctrine, THE HILL, Feb. 18,
2009, http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/other/38642-white-house-obama-
opposes-faimess-doctrine; John Eggerton, Obama Does not Support Return of Fairness
Doctrine, BROADCASTING & CABLE, June 25, 2008,
http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/114322-
Obama Does Not Support Return_ofFaimessDoctrine.php.




the Fairness Doctrine are currently conservative, this is by no means a conser-
vative issue. Historically, opponents from both the right and the left found the
Fairness Doctrine to be problematic throughout most of its existence. The cur-
rent partisan differences seem to have developed in the 1980s. Given bipartisan
doubts, alarm over renewal of the Fairness Doctrine may be dismissed simply
as fear mongering or political posturing.'o Yet, comments from experts and
policymakers following the 2008 election lent a certain amount of credence to
such claims."
obama; Bob Sheiffer, Face the Nation, (CBS NEWS BROADCAST Mar. 8, 2009) (transcript
available at http://www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/pdf/FTN 030809.pdf); Marin Cogan, Bum
Rush: Obama's Secret Plan to Muzzle Talk Radio. Very, Very Secret, THE NEW REPUBLIC
Dec. 3, 2008, at 8, available at http://www.tnr.com/article/bum-rush-0.
10 See Bob Cusack, FCC official: Fairness Doctrine talk is 'conspiratorial', THE HILL
(May 5, 2009, 3:19 AM), http://thehill.com/homenews/news/19861-fcc-official-fairness-
doctrine-talk-is-conspiratorial (referencing an FCC communication to a Senior House De-
mocratic aide that claimed "concerns about reviving the so-called Fairness Doctrine are
'conspiratorial "').
" See Boehner Press Release, supra note 5 (responding to Democratic support for rein-
stating the Fairness Doctrine); Ellen P. Goodman, No Time for Equal Time: A Comment on
Professor Magarian's Substantive Media Regulation in Three Dimensions, 76 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 897 (2008) (exploring media criticism in the recent "fairness doctrine revival
movement"); BRIAN JENNINGS, CENSORSHIP: THE THREAT TO SILENCE TALK RADIO 28-30
(2009) (detailing Fairness Doctrine Support from Democratic leaders in 2007-2008); includ-
ing former House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid and Senators
John Kerry, Jeff Bingaman and Charles Schumer); McDowell Address , supra note 2. See
also Alexander Bolton, GOP Preps for Talk Radio Confrontation, THE HILL (June 27, 2007,
3:04 PM), http://thehill.com/homenews/news/12407-gop-preps-for-talk-radio-confrontation
(describing Conservative fear that "forcing stations to make equal time for liberal talk radio
would cut into profits so drastically that radio executives would opt to scale back on conser-
vative programming to avoid escalating costs"); John Eggerton, Kerry Wants Fairness Doc-
trine Reimposed, BROADCASTING AND CABLE (June 27, 2007, 7:55 PM),
http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/109418-
Kerry_Wants FairnessDoctrine Reimposed.php (describing Senator John Kerry's support
"for reimposition of the fairness doctrine"); Cogan, supra note 9, at 8; John Gizzi, Pelosi
Supports 'Fairness' Doctrine, HUMAN EVENTS (June 25, 2008),
http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=27185; Pete Winn, Democratic Senator Tells
Conservative Radio Station He'd Re-impose Fairness Doctrine-on Them, CNS NEWS (Oct.
22, 2008), http://www.cnsnews.com/node/38008; Rep. Eshoo to Push for Fairness Doctrine,
SAN FRANCISCO PENINSULA PRESS CLUB (Dec. 16, 2008),
http://sfppc.blogspot.com/2008/12/rep-eshoo-to-push-for-faimess-doctrine.html; Another
Senator Lines Up Behind 'Fairness Doctrine', WORLDNETDAILY (Feb. 5, 2009, 11:50 PM),
http://www.wnd.com/index.php?fa=PAGE.view&pageld=88113; Michael Calderon, Sen.
Harkin: 'We need the Fairness Doctrine back', POLITICO, Feb. 11, 2009,
http://www.politico.com/blogs/michaelcalderone/0209/Sen Harkin WeneedtheFairness
Doctrine back_.html?showall (interviewing Senator Tom Harkin (D-IA) about his support
for reinstating the Fairness Doctrine); John Eggerton, Bill Clinton Talks of Re-Imposing
Fairness Doctrine or At Least 'More Balance' in Media, BROADCASTING & CABLE (Feb. 13,
2009, 10:23 AM), http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/174123-
Bill ClintonTalks of ReImposing FairnessDoctrineorAtLeastMoreBalance in
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A. Historical Development of the Fairness Doctrine
The basic principles of the Fairness Doctrine date back to the 1940s and the
Mayflower Doctrine,12 but its fundamental principles trace back to the forma-
tive years of the FCC itself. Congress created the FCC and its predecessor, the
Federal Radio Commission ("FRC"), in response to an untenable situation cre-
ated by the explosion of innovative radio enthusiasts and the electromagnetic
cacophony that followed." With the regulation of radio also came the respon-
sibility of determining who received a license and who did not.14 Conse-
quently, licensing regulation created a situation where the majority of Ameri-
cans were prohibited from broadcasting their voices at the expense of the few
who retained exclusive rights to the same. Hence, fairness was a primary pre-
occupation of the Commission from its inception, and was linked to the pursuit
of the public interest. In the late 1920s, the FRC stated:
It would not be fair, indeed it would not be good service to the public to allow a one
sided presentation of the political issues of a campaign. In so far as a program consists
of discussion of public questions, public interest requires ample play for the free and
fair competition of opposing views, and the commission believes that the principle
applies not only to addresses by political candidates but to all discussions of issues of
importance to the public.15
The Communications Act of 1934 consolidated regulation of various com-
munication technologies into one agency. The FRC was abolished and much of
its responsibilities, as well as conceptual frameworks such as "fairness," were
rolled into the new Federal Communications Commission. 6 As discussed be-
Media.php; Brent Budowsky, Fairness Follies, THE HILL (Feb 23, 2009, 1:26 PM),
http://thehill.com/opinion/columnists/brent-budowsky/24650-fairness-follies (describing
democratic opposition to the Fairness Doctrine).
12 In re Mayflower Broadcasting Corp. 8 F.C.C. 333 (1941).
13 See FRANCIS CHASE, JR., SOUND AND FURY: AN INFORMAL HISTORY OF
BROADCASTING 19 et seq. (1942); ROBERT B. HORWITZ, THE IRONY OF REGULATORY
REFORM: THE DEREGULATION OF AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 117-119 (1989) (de-
scribing how "by 1927, over 700 radio stations were operating" and how "[r]adio interfer-
ence was becoming an intractable problem, especially after a 1926 district court decision
ruled that under the Radio Act of 1912 the Commerce Secretary had no authority to refuse
licenses or to compel licensees to comply with rules regarding frequency, power limits, or
hours of operation."); CHRISTOPHER H. STERLING & JOHN M. KITTROSS, STAY TUNED: A
HISTORY OF AMERICAN BROADCASTING 141-143, 207-209 (3rd ed., 2002) (describing the
"chaos" and need for regulation prior to the creation of the FCC and FRC).
14 See e.g., STERLING & KITTROSS, supra note 13, at 142-143 (illustrating the FRC's
licensing regulation policies).
15 In re Application of Great Lakes Broadcasting Co., FRC Docket 4900, 3 F.R.C. Ann.
Rep. 32 (1929).




low, fairness was part and parcel of the FCC's policy goals.
In its Mayflower decision, the FCC prohibited editorializing by stations un-
der the tacit presumption of fairness." Mayflower Broadcasting Corporation
unsuccessfully applied for a frequency already in use by WAAB, owned by
Yankee Network, Inc., but WAAB faced heavy FCC scrutiny with its own re-
newal application.'" Though it did ultimately grant the renewal, the Commis-
sion found that the station had violated the Commission's non-advocacy pol-
icy. It stated, "[t]ruly free radio cannot be used to advocate the causes of the
licensee. It cannot be used to support the candidacies of his friends. It cannot
be devoted to the support of principles he happens to regard most favorably"."
With the Mayflower decision, the FCC began to shape the two prongs of the
Fairness Doctrine. It also marked one of the FCC's most restrictive and possi-
bly controversial eras of the policy.20 However, the heavy-handed policy of the
"Mayflower Doctrine" soon proved to be unworkable and in a 1949 policy
statement, known as the Report on Editorializing, the FCC softened its stance
on editorializing and "returned to its 'balanced program' view."2' The Com-
mission stated, "The most significant meaning of freedom of the radio is the
right of the American people to listen to this great medium of communications
free from any governmental dictation as to what they can or cannot hear and
free alike from similar restraints by private licensees."22 Nevertheless, broad-
caster's speech rights were to be balanced with the American people's right to
listen, and that editorializing was still subject to a standard of "overall fair-
ness."23 The 1949 report is generally recognized as the formalization of the
FCC's Fairness Doctrine.24 In 1959, Congress amended the Communications
Act of 1934 to exempt newscasts from the requirement to provide equal air-
time to federal candidates.25 Lest the amended language create the presumption
'7 In re Mayflower Broadcasting Corp. 8 F.C.C. 333, 341 (1941).
18 Id. at 333-334.
'9 Id. at 340.
20 See FORD ROWAN, BROADCAST FAIRNESS: DOCTRINE, PRACTICE, PROSPECTS 31
(1984); STEVEN J. SIMMONS, THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE AND THE MEDIA 38(1979); JUNG, Su-
pra note 4, at 9.
21 HORWITZ, supra note 13, at 159.
22 In re Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, Report of the Commission, 13 F.C.C.
1246, 1257, 1 20 (1949).
23 Id. at 1246, 1.2.
24 See JUNG, supra note 4, at 9 (explaining that "[m]ost agree this 1949 commission
report formalized" the Fairness Doctrine policy); SIMMONS, supra note 20, at 45.
25 See H.R. Rep. No. 1069 (1959), reprinted in 1959 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2582, 2583. Con-
gress voted to amend section 315(a) of the Communications Act of 1934 "to provide that the
equal-time provisions with respect to candidates for public office shall not apply to news
and other similar programs").
The 1959 Amendment stemmed from worries newscasts would not cover federal candi-
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of weakening the Fairness Doctrine, Congress included language reaffirming
broadcasters' continued responsibility to act in the public interest and "afford
reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views on issues of pub-
lic importance."26 A decade later, in its landmark Red Lion decision the Su-
preme Court affirmed the Doctrine's constitutionality and recognized Con-
gress's statutory approval of the rule in the 1959 Amendment.27
The 1980s ushered in the deregulatory policies of the Reagan Revolution in
general and renewed attacks on the Fairness Doctrine from the Fowler Com-
mission in particular. This raised intense political debates over whether the
Doctrine was in fact codified by the 1959 Amendment28 and affirmed by Red
Lion29.30 In 1985, the FCC issued its Fairness Report, which asserted that the
doctrine was no longer achieving its intended effect but actually chilled speech
on controversial issues and unduly interfered with freedom of the press." An
additional purpose of the report was to demonstrate that the Red Lion had re-
lied on incorrect assertions that the Fairness Doctrine did not inhibit coverage
or important and controversial issues32 and that the Court's decision in Red
Lion was based on a marketplace that no longer existed due to significant tech-
nological innovations."3 The FCC sidestepped the question of whether it had
the requisite statutory authority to eliminate the doctrine," instead deferring
that to Congress in light of the new information it had provided. A seismic
shift in the debate seems to have occurred in a case challenging the FCC's in-
terpretation that Section 315(1) did not compel it to apply the Fairness Doc-
trine to new teletext technologies if it deemed it would inhibit development of
dates for fear of having to provide the same amount of coverage to their opponents demon-
strating that congress at least tacitly recognized the potential chilling effect of the Fairness
Doctrine. FRED W. FRIENDLY, THE GOOD GUYS, THE BAD Guys, AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT: FREE SPEECH vs. FAIRNESS IN BROADCASTING 25-26 (1976).
26 Id. at 2584.
27 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
28 See Jung, supra note 4, at 60-62,91,96.
29 Id. at 40, 93, 235.
30 RedLion Broadcasting Co., 395 U.S. 367, 375-377.
31 In re Section 73.1910 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations Concerning the
General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast Licensees, Report, 102 F.C.C. 2d 142,
145 (1985) (stating the Commission "no longer believe[s] that the fairness doctrine, as a
matter of policy, serves the public interest" and that the doctrine has an "impermissible
'chilling' effect' on the free expression of ideas.").
32 Jung, supra note 4, at 114.
3 Id.
34 In re Section 73.1910 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations Concerning the




the technology. In his opinion, Federal Appeals Judge Robert Bork, joined by
Judge Anton Scalia, wrote that the 1959 Amendment did not compel the FCC
to enforce the policy but merely ratified the FCC's position at that time that the
Fairness Doctrine served the public interest." Two years later, the
courts clarified Red Lion, explicitly declaring that the doctrine was not man-
dated by Congress and the FCC was not required to enforce it." On August 4,
1987, the FCC officially repealed the Fairness Doctrine."
B. Previous Problems with the Fairness Doctrine
An overarching problem of the Fairness Doctrine was the basic premise of
the doctrine itself: the enforcement of "fairness." Former NBC correspondent
and attorney Ford Rowan illustrates the dilemma by posing a hypothetical:
"Suppose the government, in an effort to promote this ideal, enacted a Good-
ness Doctrine requiring that citizens be good."" Such a goal is certainly laud-
able, and the implementation, though inconvenient, could possibly be justified
by the potential benefits. However, such a law would create issues of its own:
There would be immediate practical problems, however, in implementing the Goodness
Doctrine. Aside from those who are downright evil, most people fail to be good all the
time. Few would measure up to a Goodness Standard. Moreover, honest people can
disagree about what's good in a particular situation. The vagueness inherent in legislat-
ing goodness would, of necessity, leave a lot of discretion to the individual. Many peo-
ple might act reasonably, in good faith, only to find the government regulator's idea of
goodness did not correspond to their own. On the other hand, some would take advan-
tage of the flexibility built into such a doctrine to try to rationalize heinous behavior.
The resulting disparity in conduct would cry out for government action. People would
not know what was expected of them; abuses would be highlighted. Before long it
would become clear that government policy is inadequate and inconsistent when it re-
quires adherence to a vague standard of right conduct. Vigorous regulation would risk
unacceptable infringement upon individual freedom.39
35 Telecommc'ns Res. and Action Center v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501 (D.C. Cir.), pet. for
reh'g en banc denied, 806 F.2d 111 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert denied, 55 U.S.L.W. 821 (U.S.
1987).
36 Meredith Corp. v. FCC, 809 F.2d 863, 869, 872 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
37 In re Matter of Inquiry into Section 73.1910 for the Commission's Rules and Regula-
tions Concerning Alternatives to the General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast
Licensees, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 17 F.C.C.R. 5272 (Aug. 4, 1987); FCC De-
clares Fairness Doctrine Unconstitutional, TELEVISION DIGEST, Aug. 10, 1987, 1; Eleanor
Randolph, FCC Rescinds 'Fairness Doctrine': Broadcasters Hail End to 'Intrusion', WASH.
POST, Aug. 5, 1987, at Al.
38 RoWAN, supra note 20, at 1.
3 Id. at 1-2.
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Many societies aspire to be "good" societies and rely on laws dictated by the
norms and precepts of their cultures to do so. Yet aspiration turns to folly when
societies attempt to prescriptively enforce virtue through law, and laws are best
when they are proscriptive rather than prescriptive. Rowan notes that the same
problems that make such a hypothetical untenable similarly plagued attempts
to enforce the public virtue, and public interest, of "fairness." 40 From its incep-
tion, the Fairness Doctrine was controversial. During its 38 years in existence,
the Fairness Doctrine has faced an extensive barrage of legal and academic
debates focusing on a myriad of economic, social and constitutional issues.'
Never during this time did it achieve any degree of affirmative consensus.
Criticism of the doctrine fell into two main categories, constitutional concerns
and enforcement issues.
1. Constitutional Criticisms
At the heart of the constitutional debate is the question of to what extent did
the policy and its implementation constitute an abridgement of speech? Due to
the technological limitations that prevent everyone from using the limited elec-
tromagnetic resource, the government stepped in to choose who could have
access.42 Broadcasters became trustees of a "public resource."43 University of
California San Diego communication professor Robert Horwitz states,
In theory, they had to accommodate the views, tastes, and concerns of those excluded
from the airwaves. Broadcast licensees were entrusted with a piece of public domain,
and were to act as fiduciaries on behalf of the public, as proxies for those who did not
have access to the airwaves."
Thus, broadcasters could not expect absolute First Amendment privileges.4 5
Still, as Horwitz notes, broadcasters were not common carriers;46 yet
40 See id. at 2 (noting the difficulties of quantifying and measuring fairness similarly
made it difficult for the Government to enforce its Fairness Mandate).
41 See FRIENDLY, supra note 25, at 12-77 (providing an overview of the academic and
legal challenges of the Fairness Doctrine from its implementation through its demise in
1987). See discussion infra Part II.B.l.
42 See FRIENDLY, supra note 25, at 15-16 (describing the government's constitutional
context for regulating the airwaves).
43 HORWITZ, supra note 13, at 119-120.
44Id. at 120.
45 Id. at 119.
46 The Communications Act of 1934 provides for the classification of common carrier.
A distinguishing characteristic of common carriers is they provide a service to the public
indiscriminately See FCC v Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979). See also Eli M.
Noam, Beyond liberalization H1: The impending doom of common carriage, 18.6
TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY, 435-452 (Aug. 1994). The distinction between common
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[b]roadcast regulation essentially represented an uneasy compromise between formal
First Amendment protections and a narrow form of common carrier obligations. The
broadcaster had to provide equal opportunity of air time to candidates for political of-
fice and were generally obliged to present balanced programming. (This general obli-
gation was later codified into the FCC's fairness doctrine.)
This left regulators with the equivalent of "walking a constitutional tight-
rope,"48 as noted by the Supreme Court:
This role of the Government as an "overseer" and ultimate arbiter and guardian of the
public interest and the role of the licensee as a journalistic "free agent" call for a deli-
cate balancing of competing interests. The maintenance of this balance for more than
40 years has called on both the regulators and the licensees to walk a "tightrope" to
preserve First Amendment values written into the Radio Act and its successor, the
Communications Act. 4
9
While the Fairness Doctrine still operated as good law, the courts struggled
with various competing First Amendment considerations. U.S. Court of Ap-
peals Judge Skelly Wright observed:
In some areas of the law it is easy to tell the good guys from the bad guys. In the cur-
rent debate over the broadcast media and the First Amendment, however, each debater
claims to be the real protector of the First Amendment, and the analytical problems
are much more difficult than in ordinary constitutional adjudication.""o
For example, in its Mayflower decision, while arguably enacting its most re-
pressive restrictions on broadcasters' free speech, the FCC used a free speech
rationale to justify its actions:
Freedom of speech on the radio must be broad enough to provide full and equal op-
portunity for the presentation to the public of all sides of public issues. Indeed, as one
licensed to operate in a public domain the licensee has assumed the obligation of pre-
senting all sides of important public questions, fairly, objectively and without bias.
The public interest-not the private-is paramount."
carrier and content provider in telecomm law dates back to a contractual agreement on July
1, 1926 to resolve various intra-industry battles between the "Radio Group" led by RCA and
the "Telephone Group" let by AT&T. The agreement averted potentially paralyzing compe-
tition between the two groups and in effect created the division between broadcasting,
which would have editorial authority, albeit somewhat limited, over content; and telecom-
munications, which transmitted messages for others, irrespective of the content. HORWITZ,
supra note 13, at 115-117. This has had legal implications in terms of differing rights and
responsibilities of producers versus distributors. See Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc., 776 F.
Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995); 47 U.S.C. § 230.
47 Id. at 120.
48 ROWAN, supra note 20, at 17.
49 CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 117 (1973).
50 Judge Skelly Wright, Commencement Address at The George Washington University
National Law Center (June 3, 1973) quoted in FRIENDLY, supra note 25, at IX.
51 In re Mayflower Broadcasting Corp. 8 F.C.C. 333, 340 (1941).
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Some contended the Fairness Doctrine (unlike censorship) added to the
number of voices.52 Even assuming such were the case, the doctrine raised a
First Amendment issue of forcing speech, which was seen as problematic re-
gardless of the professed benefits." Yet many journalists and broadcasters ar-
gued that the policy was an unconstitutional intrusion of government into con-
tent and complained that FCC enforcement pushed stations to be circumspect
in their coverage of controversial issues.54 Such was the case in 1980 when all
three television networks refused to air an issue ad produced by Mobil Oil for
fear it would prompt Fairness Doctrine requests." On another occasion, ABC
canceled airing the halftime show of a college football game over concerns that
a planned anti-war protest would trigger Fairness complaints.56
The Fairness Doctrine reached beyond the national debate, delving into state
politics as well. During the 1978 California campaign, which included the rati-
fication of California Supreme Court Chief Justice Rose Bird, opponents aired
two ads critical of Bird. 7 Her supporters urged TV stations not to carry the
advertisement, invoking the Fairness Doctrine under the argument that judicial
ratification differed from traditional political campaigns and the Equal Oppor-
tunity rule." Thus, they contended, stations should also air pro-Bird ads at no
cost. The result was that no television stations in the state's two largest mar-
kets-the Bay Area and the Los Angeles basin-accepted the ads, effectively
ending the campaign against her after stripping opponents of their most effec-
tive form of communication." Whether such threats were an appropriate appli-
52 See ROWAN, supra note 25, at 32.
53 Id.
54 See FRIENDLY, supra note 25, at 13-15 (describing how writer and critic Gilbert
Seldes called Journalist Edward R. Murrow's coverage of Senator Joseph R. McCarthy was
more of an unfair attack, and less about fairness in coverage); JUNG, supra note 4, at 9-10
ROWAN, supra note 20, at 15 et seq.
5 Television: Sponsorship and Censorship, TIME, Feb. 11, 1980, available at
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,950262,00.html.
56 In re Complaint of Student Assoc. of the State Univ. of New York, Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 40 F.C.C. 2d 510, 511 (1973).
5 See PREBLE STOLZ, JUDGING JUDGES: THE INVESTIGATION OF ROSE BIRD AND THE
CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT 49 (1981). One ad featured a disturbing rape scenario, where
the announcer's voice announced "Next May that rapist could be on the streets again be-
cause Rose Bird and the Supreme Court reversed an appellate court decision and said they
did not think the victim had experienced 'great bodily injury'." Id The second ad urged
voters to "vote 'no' on Rose Bird", accusing the Judge of ignoring the educational and so-
cial needs of neighborhood children. Id.
58 See id. (noting that supporters argued that the ads were "particularly unfair and inap-
propriate" as well as "false and misleading").
5 Id. at 49-50.
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cation of the Fairness Doctrine or would even have been successful if indeed
carried out is irrelevant. The focus from a policy and regulation standpoint is
the actual impact of the doctrine. As with the other above mentioned cases, the
mere threat of the Fairness Doctrine had a chilling effect upon speech and de-
bate of controversial issues.
According to Horwitz, constitutional rationales for a modified First
Amendment status for broadcasting developed post hoc through judicial opin-
ions. During the 1920's radio was seen more as an entertainment medium,
much like motion pictures and was not considered to be part of the press. The
general acceptance of media effect theories (such as the hypodermic needle
theory"o) provided ample reason for legislators to place limitations on the
power of broadcasters in the Radio Act of 1927, and later in the Communica-
tions Act of 1934.6" It was not until Red Lion that the Court actually affirmed
the constitutionality of the doctrine.62 The ruling was based in large part on the
scarcity argument." Furthermore, the Court found that under the so-called
"personal attack" rule, broadcasters could be compelled to allow individuals a
reasonable opportunity to respond to attacks broadcast by the station.' Red
Lion also contains an oft forgotten caution from the Court, if the rule ever re-
sulted in the restraint of speech, then the rule's legality should be revisited.6' A
few years later, in Miami Herald v. Tornillo, the Court ruled that the Fairness
Doctrine had a chilling effect on speech.66 Interestingly, the Court did not over-
turn the constitutionality of the Fairness Doctrine. In 1984, the Court did find
that the original assumptions of scarcity were flawed and that the rule was
60 The hypodermic needle theory (sometimes referred to as "magic bullet theory") was a
behaviorist influenced media effects theory during the mid-twentieth century that posited
mass media had a direct, immediate and powerful effect on mass audiences, which were
viewed as passive receivers with very few mental barriers against the persuasive power of
mass media. As a result media could uniformly and directly influence large groups of peo-
ple. Persuasive messages could in effect be injected directly into the audience's minds to
mold people's thoughts, behaviors and attitudes. JENNINGS BRYANT & SUSAN THOMPSON,
FUNDAMENTALS OF MEDIA EFFECTS, 36-42 (McGraw Hill 2002).
61 HORWITZ,supra note 13, at 120.
62 See ROWAN, supra note 20, at 4.
63 See Red Lion Broadcasting Co., 395 U.S. at 400-401. The scarcity argument has been
a primary rationale for the FCC's regulation of broadcasting in general and broadcast con-
tent in particular. It posits that since the electromagnetic spectrum is limited and thus insuf-
ficient to allow everyone access to accommodate everyone's voice, government may and
should intrude into the message content. See John W. Berresford, Regulating Traditional
Broadcasting: An Idea Whose Time Has Passed. (FCC Media Bureau Research Paper, Mar.
2005), available at http://www.fcc.gov/ownership/materials/already-
released/scarcity030005.pdf.
6 Red Lion Broadcasting Co., 395 U.S. at 377-378.
65 Id. at 373-375.
66 See Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U. S. 241 (1974).
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chilling free speech."7
2. Enforcement Criticisms
The second problem created by the Fairness Doctrine was its enforcement.
During its tenure as accepted policy, the FCC faced several logistical and prac-
tical problems. One of the biggest issues was the amount of time required to
deal with the massive amount of viewer complaints." Costs cannot be limited
to the taxpayer alone because stations and networks spent a great deal of capi-
tal and energy to protect themselves from potential regulatory action, in addi-
tion to the potential of losses of creativity and programming from concerns of
falling afoul of the FCC. This concern was further exacerbated by the re-
markably small number of cases in which the FCC actually overruled stations'
editorial decisions.69 For example, in 1980, of the 10,301 Fairness Doctrine
complaints the FCC received, only twenty-eight were found to have cause and
only six cases were decided against the station.70 Former University of Califor-
nia at Irvine law professor and former Broadcasting Board of Governors mem-
ber Steven J, Simmons notes similar disparities between the number of com-
plaints and actual violations. As with the constitutional problems, this disparity
illustrates a significant chasm between intended and actual outcomes of the
policy. The administrative complications created by actual enforcement of the
Fairness Doctrine produced an end result quite different from the original no-
ble objectives behind the policy.'
In dealing with fairness complaints, the FCC first had to determine whether
a "view" had been shared, and if so, whether the issue was sufficiently contro-
versial or of public importance to merit invoking the Fairness Doctrine.72 This
proved to be difficult in practice. Ideas had to be "popular" in order to merit
recognition." Excluded were eccentric ideas or those from small groups or
67 See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
68 See ROWAN, supra note 20, at 51 (noting that in 1980, the FCC received 21,563 Fair-
ness Doctrine complaints).
69 Id
70 See id. (noting that "out of more than 20,000 complaints, broadcasters 'lost' only
six.").
7' See SIMMONS, supra note 20, at 11 (describing the disparity between the large volume
of complaints and the problems of enforcement).
72 See id. at 154 ("once the issues raised in a broadcast have been identified, it still must
be determined whether they are 'controversial' and of 'public importance"').
7 See id. at 159 (giving the example that "if a lone pariah's ideas or those of a small




individuals since there was no "debate."74 The FCC's guidelines for determin-
ing an issue were vague, and their inconsistent application by the FCC resulted
in no reliable precedent." Furthermore, throughout several cases, the FCC
failed to articulate whether an issue was controversial or of public impor-
tance." This left licensees with very little guidance on how to avoid running
afoul of Fairness Doctrine requirements, which had the natural consequence of
causing stations to become overly cautious in their programming decisions.
If it were determined that a case merited scrutiny, the FCC was then faced
with a series of additional questions of staggering complexity. First, what con-
trasting viewpoint should be shared? Most issues do not consist of an either/or
problem but rather a confluence of additional factors, issues and problems.
Second, who should be the appropriate spokesperson to share this view? Not
all spokespersons are created equal. Some are more articulate; others less.
Some are more ardent in their views or partisanship (i.e. the appellation of
"moderate"). Third, when will the counter view be shared so as to ensure fair
coverage of the issues? Fourth and fifth are corollaries of the third question.
How often will the view be shared? Further, how much total time allotted
would be considered fair? These last three issues often involved inconsistent
calculations to determine equitable reach and audience size."
C. Heuristics & Behavior
Faced with increasing complexity and uncertainty, human beings tend to
rely on heuristics to help reduce cognitive overload." Over the years, given the
complexity inherent in trying to enforce something as ambiguous as "fairness,"
the Commission ultimately came to rely on a philosophy of balance. The prob-
lem with balance is two-fold. First, it relies on an oversimplified and unrealis-
tic two-sided model of conflict, which fails to neatly map onto many multi-
dimensional issues. Second, balance is next to impossible to determine. Even if
it is assumed that all players are playing fair and with the best of intentions,
74 Id
7 See id. at 155 (noting that "where the determination has not been so obvious . .. the
FCC has decided cases inconsistently and has often failed to offer an explanatory rationale
for its decisions" making them difficult to follow in future cases).
76 SIMMONS, supra note 20, at 155-156.
n See FRIENDLY, supra note 25, at 118-119; Rowan, supra note 20, at 120-123, 146-
149, 153-156.
78 ROWAN, supra note 20, at 190-192, 195.
79 For background, see generally Miriam J. Metzger et. al, Social and Heuristic Ap-
proaches to Credibility Evaluation Online, 60 J. COMMC'N 413, 417 (2010).
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balance is a concept detached from context or rationality. For instance, what
would be the appropriate balance to covering the war on drugs, Prohibition,
ERA, the nuclear arms race, abortion, illegal immigration, Vietnam, or the War
on Terrorism? Each involves contesting participants. In addition, myriads of
third and even fourth parties are affected or hold views related to the issues
surrounding these hot political topics. Who should represent these views, and
how much time should they get? Furthermore, as Simmons points out, "by ma-
nipulating format, a licensee can favor one spokesman or viewpoint over an-
other and be deemed reasonable by the FCC."so For instance, in a discussion
panel, contrasting views representing both sides of an issue may be presented,
but the composition of panelists would influence both the discussion as well as
the perceived outcomes. Factors such as the ratio of panelists with a certain
viewpoint as well as the halo effect"' would have an impact from a practical
sense but not necessarily a regulatory sense.
If this seems problematic in theory, imagine the application of such princi-
ples. Case studies demonstrate the FCC was inconsistent in both practice and
theory when it came to addressing such questions.82 The Commission's lack of
clarity regarding how stations were to determine a proper balance or demon-
strate compliance further aggravated consistent application of the doctrine.
Indeed, the only noteworthy aspect about the FCC's fairness guidelines was
their lack of specificity." Several statements from the FCC reflect this notion.
In 1974, the Commission acknowledged "the road to predicting Commission
decisions in this area is not fully and completely marked," though it claimed
there were "signposts which should be recognizable to all concerned parties."84
8 Id. at 195.
81 The "halo effect" refers to the long established cognitive phenomenon in which the
attributes of a more easily observable trait influence judgment of the other less observable
traits. For example, people who are more beautiful or have a recognized celebrity status may
also be perceived as more intelligent. Thus, the status of a spokesperson plays a significant
role in the impact of their position. The choice of such a spokesperson is often the discretion
of the journalist or producer, making the whole thing subject to manipulation. Furthermore,
while the FCC might be able to tabulate responses in a sort of scorekeeper fashion, it would
be unable to determine the actual impact of each response, essentially rendering the whole
process moot.
82 See Committee for Fair Broadcasting of Controversial Issues, 25 F.C.C.2d 283
(1970); FRIENDLY, supra note 29; National Broadcasting Co., 16 F.C.C.2d 956 (1969); Pub-
lic Media Center, 59 F.C.C.2d 494 (1976); SIMMONS, supra note 20; In re Complaint of the
Wilderness Society v. NBC, 31 F.C.C.2d 729 (1971).
83 See SIMMONS, supra note 20, at 55 (describing how "licensees were left adrift in a sea
of uncertainty as to precisely what was expected of them under the Fairness Doctrine.").
84 Fairness Doctrine and Public Interest Standards: Fairness Report Regarding Handling
of Public Issues, 39 Fed. Reg. 26372 (July 18, 1974).
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FCC Fairness/Political Branch Chief Milton Gross stated, "You have to look at
the entire picture. There's no one thing ... [but] time of day, frequency, things
like that ... are taken into consideration."" Simmons notes that several com-
missioners, "refused to state any personal formula for determining a set ratio of
time that was so out of proportion that it violated the fairness doctrine.""
Commissioner Benjamin Hooks stated, "We don't have a written rule" to de-
termine the amount of time that should be allocated for each side." Rather,
commissioners relied on general heuristics to judge each proceeding on a case-
by-case basis" much like the notion of the "reasonable man" standard relied on
by courts." Yet, as Simmons points out, "reasonable" is a vague and idiosyn-
cratic notion."o What is reasonable for one may seem preposterous to the other.
In other words, like beauty, reasonable is in the eye of the beholder. Or rather,
what is reasonable is a matter of perception.
Perhaps most troubling is the incredible paucity of evidence that the policy
had any impact on removing bias from reporting. Rowan observes that a pri-
mary key to such a problem lies in the inherent subjectivity of the consumer as
well as the producer of news." Thus, he contends:
No amount of government regulation, short of the kind of censorship currently prohib-
ited by Section 326 of the Communications Act, would remedy problems of such sub-
jectivity ... .Many factors account for the shortcomings of subjectivity, shallowness,
and sensationalism in news reporting, and none are susceptible to cure by government
intervention." 92
Indeed, the one impact the Fairness Doctrine had on news reporting behavior
was its chilling effect.
III. HOSTILE MEDIA PERCEPTION & AUDIENCES
A. Perception and Effect
A third difficulty exists beyond the constitutional and logistical problems of
enforcing the Fairness Doctrine. While scholars have analyzed the Fairness
Doctrine from the perspective of government, media outlets and public speak-
85 SIMMoNs, supra note 20, at 196.
86 Id. at 233 n.58.
87 Id. at 196.
88 See Commissioner Charlotte Reid's remarks in SIMMONs, supra note 20, at 233 n.58.
89 See id. at 196. Hooks comments that "[n]obody has ever defined that standard with
exactitude, and yet we have existed for two hundred years in the courts, using that stan-
dard.").
90 Id
91 ROwAN, supra note 20, at 126.
92 Id
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ers, much of the research has failed to consider the core group for whom the
doctrine was created in the first place-the audience. Given research in the
past 25 years in the realm of media psychology, the Fairness Doctrine, from a
cost-benefit analysis, becomes even less desirable.
The hostile media effect, or hostile media perception, is a viewer-centric
phenomenon. While traditionally media effects theories have argued that the
media influences the viewer, HMP instead views the media receiver as the
primary shaper of a message's meaning." More specifically, HMP posits that
as individuals increase in levels of partisanship, they also increase in the per-
ception that the media is hostile towards their group or position.94 HMP can
occur not only with political partisans in election coverage," but with indi-
viduals strongly attached to religious groups," citizens from opposing coun-
tries," people on opposing sides of a labor issue," sports fans," soldiers fol-
9 Id.
94 See Robert P. Vallone, Lee Ross, & Mark R. Lepper, The Hostile Media Phenome-
non: Biased Perception and Perceptions of Media Bias in Coverage of the Beirut Massacre,
49 J. OF PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 577 (1985); Albert C. Gunther & Kathleen Schmitt,
Mapping Boundaries of the Hostile Media Effect, 54 J. OF COMM. 55 (2004).
95 See generally Russell J. Dalton, Paul Allen Beck, & Robert Huckfeldt, Partisan Cues
and the Media: Information Flows in the 1992 Presidential Election, 92 AM. POL. Scl. REV.
Ill (1998) (examining the role of information flows and media perception in the 1992
Presidential election).
96 See generally Amarina Ariyanto, Matthew J. Hornsey, & Cindy Gallois, Group Alle-
giance and Perceptions of Media Bias: Taking Into Account Both the Perceiver and the
Source, 10 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP RELATIONS 266 (2007). Authors set-up an
experiment where two groups, one Muslim and one Christian, read a newspaper article de-
scribing religious conflict. They found that when the article was attributed to a Muslim pa-
per, then groups found it biased towards Muslims; and when attributed to a Christian paper,
groups found it biased towards Christians. Id.
9 See Roger Giner-Sorolla & Shelly Chaiken, The Causes of Hostile Media Judgments,
30 J. OF EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 165 (1994) (examining hostile media judgments
from the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict); Richard M. Perloff, Ego-involvement
and the Third-Person Effect of Televised News Coverage, 16 CoMM. RES. 236 (1989) (ex-
amining the how a groups of 34 pro-Israeli and 34 pro-Palestinian groups viewed non-
partisan news coverage of the conflict).
9 See Cindy T. Christen, Prathana Kannaovakun, & Albert C. Gunther, Hostile Media
Perceptions: Partisan Assessments of Press and Public During the 1997 United Parcel Ser-
vice Strike, 19 POL. COMM. 423 (2002) (finding that "partisan groups perceived neutral news
coverage as biased against their respective sides" in assessing coverage of the 1997 Team-
sters-United Parcel Service Strike).
99 See Laura M. Arpan & Arthur A. Raney, An Experimental Investigation of News
Source and the Hostile Media Effect, 80 JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. Q. 265 (2003) (find-
ing strong support for hostile media effect "among sports news consumers" in an experi-
ment where sports fans read a "a balanced story about their home-town college football
team in one of three newspapers: the home-town, the cross-state rival university's town, or a
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lowing war coverage,'o and those invested in controversial issues covered by
the media, such as the use of animals in laboratory experiments.' 1 Even if the
media content is apparently neutral, partisans from both sides exposed to the
same information will perceive the media as biased against their side.'02 An
examination of HMP requires a look at its necessary prerequisites, the mecha-
nisms behind how HMP actually occurs, and the consequences of HMP.
B. The Potential Causes of HMP
The necessary conditions of HMP are still contested, though many scholars
see involvement as a key factor in triggering HMP. Defining involvement en-
compasses ideas such as salience, 03 personal relevance,'" partisanship,"' and
opinion extremity.o' Value-relevant involvement references "the psychological
neutral-town paper.").
ioo See Richard J. Pinder, Dominic Murphy, Stephani L. Hatch, Amy Iversen, Christo-
pher Dandeker, & Simon Wessely, A Mixed Methods Analysis of the Perceptions of the
Media by Members of the British Forces During the Iraq War, 36 ARMED FORCES & Soc.
131, 132 (2009). The authors explored how modem warfare provides new methods for sol-
diers to acquire news about the wars they are personally fighting in. They found that factors
such as the soldier's family's views (who often times provided soldiers with news about the
war) played an important role in a soldier's media perception. Id.
101 See Albert C. Gunther, Cindy T. Christen, Janice L. Liebhart, & Stella Chich-Yun
Chia, Congenial Public, Contrary Press, and Biased Estimates of the Climate of Opinion,
65 PUB. OPINION Q. 295 (2001) (supporting the notion that "partisans on each side of the
issue judged news articles to be biased in a disagreeable direction relative to judgments of
those on the other side.").
102 See Christen, Kannaovakun & Gunther, supra note 98; John D. Richardson, William
P. Huddy & Shawn M. Morgan, The Hostile Media Effect, Biased Assimilation, and Percep-
tions of a Presidential Debate, 38 J. OF APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 1255 (2008).
103 See Ronald Mulder, The Effects of Televised Political Ads in the 1975 Chicago May-
oral Election, 56 JOURNALISM QUARTERLY 336 (1979).
104 See generally Richard E. Petty, John T. Cacioppo & Rachel Goldman, Personal In-
volvement as a Determinant of Argument-Based Persuasion, 41 J. OF PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 847 (1981) (exploring the role of "personal relevance" and "personal relevance
manipulation" in communication to persuade an individuals viewpoint).
105 See generally Christen, Kannaovakun & Gunther, supra note 98; Kimberly Matheson
& Sanela Dursun, Social Identity Precursors to the Hostile Media Phenomenon: Partisan
Perceptions of Coverage of the Bosnian Conflict, 4 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP
RELATIONS 116 (2001) (finding that the "hostile media effect is a mechanism for enhancing
a positive and distinct in-group identity", that "reflects a form of in-group bias.").
106 See, e.g., Cindy T. Christen & Albert C. Gunther, The Influence of Mass Media and
Other Culprits on the Projection of Personal Opinion, 30 CoMM. RES. 414 (2003) (support-
ing the premise that "media coverage will either enhance or diminish the projection bias in
predictable directions", based on "projection" of opinions); Giner-Sorolla & Chaiken, supra
note 97, Albert C. Gunther & Cindy T. Christen, Projection or Persuasive Press? Contrary
Effects ofPersonal Opinion and Perceived News Coverage on Estimates ofPublic Opinion,
52 J. OF COMM. 177 (2002).
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state that is created by the activation of attitudes that are linked to important
values."'o
Values are fundamental to how individuals both perceive themselves and
their world, and thus are related to such concepts as ego or "self-picture."'os
Impression-relevant involvement deals with "holding an opinion that is so-
cially acceptable to potential evaluators."'" Thus, while the focus of value-
relevant involvement was internal, the focus of impression-relevant involve-
ment is external. Outcome-relevant involvement is more utilitarian in nature as
it refers to the degree to which a message is "salient to.. .the relevance of an
issue to [individuals'] currently important goals or outcomes.""o In sum:
[I]nvolvement is the motivational state induced by an association between an acti-
vated attitude and some aspect of the self-concept. For value-relevant involvement,
the pertinent aspect of the self is one's enduring values: The persuasive message acti-
vates an attitude that was linked to one's values prior to the experiment or that became
linked during the experiment. For impression-relevant involvement, the pertinent as-
pect of the self is the public self or the impression one makes on others: The issue on
which one expects to express an attitude after receiving a persuasive message is linked
to the public self by the anticipation that this attitude will be known to an evaluative
audience. For outcome-relevant involvement, the pertinent aspect of the self is one's
ability to attain desirable outcomes: The information that the persuasive message pro-
vides and the attitude one forms on the basis of this information are made to appear
relevant to the attainment of these outcomes."'
Applying these potential models to the Fairness Doctrine, it would seem that
it is either value-relevant or outcome-relevant involvement that is most accu-
rate. Political ideology is very much intertwined with one's personal values
and identity. Unlike other potential areas of media coverage that would trigger
107 Blair T. Johnson & Alice H. Eagly, Effects of Involvement on Persuasion: A Meta-
analysis, 106 PSYCHOL. BULLETIN. 290 (1989) (establishing outcome-relevant, value-
relevant, and impression forms of involvement) See e.g., Blair T. Johnson & Alice H. Eagly,
Involvement and Persuasion: Types, Traditions, and the Evidence, 107 PSYCHOL. BULLETIN.
375 (1990) (describing two distinct types of involvement; value-relevant and outcome-
relevant);; Hyunyi Cho & Franklin J. Boster, Development and Validation of Value-, Out-
come-, and Impression-Relevant Involvement Scales, 32 COMM. REs. 235 (2005); Richard E.
Petty & John T. Cacioppo, Involvement and Persuasion: Tradition versus Integration, 107
PSYCHOL. BULLETIN. 367 (1990); Jounghwa Choi, Myengja Yang & Jeongheon J.C. Chang,
Elaboration of the Hostile Media Phenomenon: The Roles of Involvement, Media Skepti-
cism, Congruency ofPerceived Media Influence, and Perceived Opinion Climate, 36 COMM.
RES. 54 (2009) (exploring the roles of involvement (all types) in hostile media effect).
10 C.W. SHERJF, M. SHERIF & R.E. NEBERGALL, ATTITUDE AND ATTITUDE CHANGE: THE
SOCIAL JUDGMENT-INVOLVEMENT APPROACH vi (1965).
109 Blair T. Johnson & Alice H. Eagly, Effects of Involvement on Persuasion: A Meta-
Analysis, 106 Psychol. Bull. 292 (1989).
110 Id.
' Id. at 293.
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values, such as religion, politics also has a competitive aspect where outcomes
are very important. It is not clear that a sharp distinction can be drawn between
the two different involvement types, since the success of individuals (candi-
dates), groups (parties), or issues (legislation, policies, or court cases) that so-
ciety intimately identifies with due to similar values can have an impact on our
self-concept similar to the way, but potentially on a deeper level, sports fans
appear to experience a temporary increase in self-worth when their team is tri-
umphant." 2
Another condition that can lead to HMP is a pre-existing belief about the
ideological orientation of a media outlet. Political Scientists Matthew Baum
and Phil Gussin performed an experiment where viewers were shown a news
report regarding the 2004 presidential election and were either told the report
came from CNN, Fox News, or a TV station that was actually fictional."' The
authors found that viewers utilized the cognitive shortcut of a media outlet's
reputation to make judgments about media content, which led to the perception
of bias where none existed.1 4 Baum and Gussin note:
If, as we contend, ideologues distinguish between differing media outlets, this raises
the possibility that they may assess the content of those outlets in part through reliance
on a relatively simple heuristic: the outlet label. Hence, if a conservative ideologue
believes that, say, CNN has a liberal bias, this facilitates the discounting (or rejection)
of information from CNN. This also increases the likelihood of perceiving balanced
coverage on CNN as having a liberal slant. Alternatively, if the same conservative be-
lieves that FOX has a conservative bias, this facilitates greater acceptance of informa-
tion from FOX ... . Either way, the brand name functions as an information shortcut,
allowing ideologues to assume that the news presented by CNN and FOX is either
hostile or sympathetic to their ideological orientation. By assuming that information
from a given outlet is "probably dissonant" or "probably consonant" through refer-
ence to a single, easy-to-use information shortcut, an individual can save substantial
time and cognitive energy."s
Political Scientist Joel Turner performed a similar experiment, finding that
the labels of CNN and Fox News "function as ideological signals to the
viewer, with this signal being most pronounced among ideologues whose
views are supposedly at odds with those attributed to the network.""' Interest-
112 William P. Eveland & Dhavan V. Shah, The Impact of Individual and Interpersonal
Factors on Perceived News Media Bias, 24 POL. PSYCHOL. 101, 102 (2003) (concluding that
"perceptions of media bias were unrelated to the overall amount of discussion but were posi-
tively related to conversations with ideologically like-minded individuals.").
113 See generally Matthew A. Baum & Phil Gussin, In the Eye of the Beholder: How
Information Shortcuts Shape Individual Perceptions of Bias in the Media, 3 Q. J. OF POL.
SCI. 1 (2007).
114 Id
"I Id. at 5.
116 Joel Turner, The Messenger Overwhelming the Message: Ideological Cues and Per-
ceptions ofBias in Television News, 29 POL. BEHAVIOR. 441 (2007).
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ingly, when a network label was not attached to the same news story, viewers
found no ideological bias, leading Turner to conjecture that "ideological bias in
television news is merely an artificial construction that has become so in-
grained in American culture that the organization presenting the news has be-
come more important than the news product it presents.""'
Scholars have theorized four differing cognitive mechanism behind HMP.
Some have argued that HMP is caused by selective categorization, wherein
opposing partisans exposed to the same material will mentally code the infor-
mation with different valences, finding neutral or even supporting information
as hostile."' Others have posited that HMP results from selective recall, with
partisans focusing more on media content opposing their position, increasing
the content's salience, and thus resulting in the hostile content having a more
dominant place in memory."' A third proposed avenue for HMP is different
standards, which contends that partisans of opposite sides will agree on the
content's proportions and valence, but view opponents' claims as invalid or
lacking in relevance, and thus unworthy of inclusion in news content.'
20 Since
opponents' invalid and irrelevant views are included, the content therefore be-
comes biased and hostile.' 2 ' A fourth suggestion for how HMP can be ex-
plained is the perceived reach of the information, with partisans less likely to
experience HMP if they don't feel that the content will be wide-reaching and
thus influence the broader public.122 In attempting to explain this fourth poten-
tial causal mechanism of HMP, scholars theorize that:
When viewing mass media, partisans may don a particular set of lenses-lenses with a
social-level focus. If the mass media context causes partisans to think about the influ-
ence of content on a broader audience.. .that audience perspective may steer their in-
terpretation and evaluation of content toward hostile latitudes. The media channel may
prompt partisans to consider interpretations or implications they think could be mis-
leading to a natve and vulnerable audience of others. Hence, they interpret the same
information in a different, and more disagreeable, way.123
"7 Id. at 455.
"8 Kathleen M. Schmitt, Albert C. Gunther & Janice L. Liebhart, Why Partisans See
Mass Media as Biased, 31 CoMM. RES. 623,624 (2004); Albert C. Gunther & Janice L.
Liebhart, Broad Reach or Biased Source? Decomposing the Hostile Media Effect, 56 J. OF
COMM. 449 (2006).
"9 See Giner-Sorolla & Chaiken, supra note 97.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 See Cindy T. Christen & Kelli E. Huberty, Media Reach, Media Influence? The Ef-
fects of Local, National, and Internet News on Public Opinion Inferences, 84 JOURNALISM &
MASS COMM. Q. 315 (2007); Gunther & Liebhart, supra note 118, at 462 (discussing how
"reach" of information influences a partisan's hostile media perception).
123 Schmitt, Gunther & Liebhart, supra note 118, at 638.
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Scholars studying HMP have found numerous normative implications for
democracy. Partisans who experience HMP tend to gravitate towards news
programs that support their ideological leanings, creating isolated factions of
the public that are decreasingly exposed to other points of view. 2 4 Scholars
have labeled this tendency self-selective exposure.'2 5 This, coupled with the
tendency of those experiencing HMP to experience "media indignation,"
which subsequently leads to increased willingness to engage in discourse with
others over the issue perceived to be treated with bias by the media,'26 could
lead to a proliferation of citizen encounters wherein both sides feel wronged
and the need to correct media bias, but both sides also have only limited expo-
sure to opposing viewpoints.
Additionally, researchers have found that those holding minority group
opinions often deem alternative media sources, such as the Internet, more
trustworthy in order to find viewpoints similar to their own, which reinforces
their existing opinions.'27 Similarly, the most active consumers of the news-
political junkies-are nearly four times more likely to view Internet blogs as
more accurate than mainstream media than to see the mainstream media as
more accurate than blogs.'28
124 See Kevin Coe, David Tewksbury, Bradley J. Bond, Kristin L. Drogos, Robert W.
Porter, Ashley Yahn & Yuanyuan Zhang, Hostile News: Partisan Use and Perceptions of
Cable News Programming, 58 J. OF COMM. 201, 202 (2008) (finding "evidence of a relative
hostile media phenomenon, in which partisans perceive more bias in programs that do not
align with their own political perspective"); Shanto Iyengar & Kyu S. Hahn, Red Media,
Blue Media: Evidence of Ideological Selectivity in Media Use, 59 J. OF COMM. 19, 20
(2009).
125 See Natalie J. Stroud, Media Use and Political Predispositions: Revisiting the Con-
cept of Selective Exposure, 30 POL. BEHAVIOR 341 (2008) (arguing that topics "such as poli-
tics, are more likely to inspire selective exposure"). See generally Silvia Knobloch-
Westerwick & Jingbo Meng, Looking the Other Way: Selective Exposure to Attitude-
Consistent and Counterattitudinal Political Information, 36 CoMM. RES. 426 (2009).
126 See Hyunseo Hwang, Zhongdang Pan & Ye Sun, Influence of Hostile Media Percep-
tion on Willingness to Engage in Discursive Activities: An Examination of Mediating Role
of Media, II MEDIA PSYCHOLOGY 76, 78 (2008) (describing "media indignation" as the
negative emotions of "injustice or unfairness", carrying "strong elements of condemnation"
towards the media source).
127 See Junho H. Choi, James H. Watt & Michael Lynch, Perceptions ofNews Credibility
about the War in Iraq: Why War Opponents Perceived the Internet as the Most Incredible
Medium, 12 J. OF COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 209, 217-223 (2006) (examining how critics
of the Iraq War (whom the authors call "a minority partisan group because their position
differs from the Government) gravitated towards Internet news sources to provide them
information they deemed more credible than traditional, mainstream media sources).
128 See RICHARD DAVIS, TYPING POLITICS: THE ROLE OF BLOGS IN AMERICAN POLITICS
159-161 (2009). Interestingly, "conservative political views" were found to be one of sev-
eral factors increasing the likelihood an individual would select self-exposure to articles
with counter-attitudinal messages, though it is unclear if that is due to confidence in one's
own views, a desire to evaluate opposing information, or some other reason. Holding "lib-
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IV. HMP'S IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE
A. How HMP undermines the Fairnes Doctrine
At first glance, the Fairness Doctrine might appear to be a plausible solution
to two problems identified by current media scholars: actual media bias'29 and
self-selective exposure.' By forcing media outlets to cover both sides of the
story, both of these problems would seemingly be solved. Yet, the hostile me-
dia perception undermines this claim. As discussed, viewers attach an ideo-
logical slant to media outlets which biases their perceptions of the media con-
tent produced by that outlet, regardless of whether the content is neutral or not.
Thus, even if Fox News or CNN were required to provide angles on stories in
contrast to the outlets overall ideological reputation, viewers would merely
discount such cross-cutting ideological content."' Similar effects would likely
be seen in other mediums, such as talk radio or print journalism. Given that
people are gravitating towards alternative forms of media,'32 the effort required
eral political views" did not contribute to an increase in the likelihood of seeking out
counter-attitudinal messages. See Knobloch-Westerwick & Meng, supra note 125, at 444.
Additionally, American journalists are, on average, left of center politically (see Thomas E.
Patterson & Wolfgang Donsbach, "News Decisions: Journalists as Partisan Actors," 13 POL.
COMM. 455, 458 (1996), and "[t]he most-read blogs by journalists were almost exclusively
those in the liberal blogosphere," despite journalists being aware of blogs of both ideologi-
cal orientations. DAVIS, supra note 128, at 140.
129 See Dennis T. Lowry, Network TV News Framing of Good vs. Bad Economic News
Under Democrat and Republican Presidents: A Lexical Analysis of Political Bias, 85
JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. Q. 483 (2008) (examining ideological media bias in economic
news during the Clinton and Bush Presidencies); Geri A. Zeldes, Frederick Fico, Serena
Carpenter & Arvind Diddi, Partisan Balance and Bias in Network Coverage of the 2000
and 2004 Presidential Elections, 52 J. OF BROADCASTING & ELECTRONIC MEDIA 563 (2008)
(examining media and political bias in the 2000 and 2004 elections); Jonathan S. Morris,
The Daily Show with Jon Stewart and Audience Attitude Change During the 2004 Party
Conventions, 31 POL. BEHAVIOR. 79 (2009); Joseph E. Uscinski, Too Close to Call? Uncer-
tainty and Bias in Election-night Reporting, 88 Soc. ScI. Q. 51 (finding evidence of media
bias based on the "tainted dispositions" of media executives and economic motivations to
appeal to certain demographics) (2007); Tim Groseclose & Jeffrey Milyo, A Measure of
Media Bias, 120 Q. J. OF ECON. 1191 (2005) (finding media bias in major news content
shows).
130 See generally MARKUS PRIOR, POST-BROADCAST DEMOCRACY: How MEDIA CHOICE
INCREASES INEQUALITY IN POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT AND POLARIZES ELECTIONS (2007);
JAMES T. HAMILTON, ALL THE NEWS THAT'S FIT TO SELL: HOW THE MARKET TRANSFORMS
INFORMATION INTO NEWS (2004).
131 See generally Baum & Gussin, supra note 113.
132 See PRIOR, supra note 130, at 150 et. seq (noting that traditional news outlets are




to enforce the Fairness Doctrine, including ongoing media monitoring, would
seem hardly worth the negligible to non-existent effects it would likely have on
an increasingly smaller portion of the populace.
As previously discussed, the cost-to-benefit ratio for enforcing the original
Fairness Doctrine was prohibitive. The FCC faced staggering amounts of paper
work, although only a few of those complaints were found to have cause.'
One explanation for this disparity was that the public confused the Fairness
Doctrine with The Equal Time rule. The Equal Time rule mandated that if a
licensee allowed a legally qualified candidate to broadcast via their facility, it
must offer equal time to any other legally qualified candidate running for that
same office.'34 Such a one-to-one formula was not a part of the enforcement of
the Fairness Doctrine. In Fairness complaints the FCC attempted to determine
whether the licensee's programming as a whole was balanced, though in prac-
tice this proved next to impossible to achieve. Furthermore, unlike the Equal
Time Rule, licensees had broad editorial discretion in selecting contesting
views. This was further complicated by attempts to use the Fairness Doctrine
as a "crude tool for obtaining access to the airwaves" by just about anybody
with an agenda.' HMP offers an additional explanation for the high number
of "false" complaints. Individuals with high levels of involvement in an issue
or group are more likely to experience HMP, causing them to see media bias
where even neutral or "fair" content exists."' Thus, the fact that individuals
with the highest levels of involvement are both those most likely to take the
time and effort to file a report with the FCC, as well as those most likely to
experience HMP and therefore perceive a violation of the Fairness Doctrine by
the media, results in the potential perfect storm where the FCC would experi-
ence a deluge of complaints.' Regulators dealt with this onslaught of paper-
work by creating barriers to the public through the use of forms and bureau-
cratic procedures intended to discourage complaints.'" This resulted in in-
creased confusion and frustration on the part of the public. It also served to
work against the original intent of the policy to make access to the airwaves
fair and democratic.'39
It has been observed that the partisanship in the U.S. has not only increased
133 See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
134 Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, § 315, 48 Stat. 1064, 1088 (codi-
fied as amended 47 U.S.C. § 315 (2000)). The equal opportunity rule is also know as the
equal time rule.
"3 ROWAN, supra note 20, at 6.
136 HAMILTON, supra note 132, at 73.
13 See discussion, supra Part II.A-B.
138 SIMMONs, supra note 20, at 208-210.
1 Id. at 220-22 1.
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but become increasingly more intense in the past three decades.' Furthermore,
the literature on HMP demonstrates that as partisanship increases, people are
more susceptible to increased hostile media perception.14' Thus, media con-
sumers, armed with the knowledge that media outlets must be fair in their
presentation of opposing sides to a story, would turn into non-deputized exten-
sions of the FCC. Furthermore, so-called watchdogs would see unfairness
whenever a media outlet of an opposing ideological reputation tried to present
their side of the story. It is not difficult to imagine a liberal (or conservative)
feeling Fox News' (or CNN's) treatment of their position to have not been
"fair." The result would be a flood of complaints to the FCC over violations of
the Fairness Doctrine.
Another issue that must be considered is the more direct impact of HMP
upon the regulators themselves. It is unrealistic to assume that regulators oper-
ate in a protective bubble, free from partisan views and ideological leanings.
Thus, it is important to consider in judging the "fairness" of any given com-
plaint, regulators will likely have their own partisan views weigh in on their
judgments.'42 The use of heuristics in judging complaints could further increase
the likelihood of biased decisions. This would lead to an even greater chilling
effect as broadcasters would become even more reluctant to present anything
that would deluge them with an onslaught of complaints and bureaucratic red
tape.
B. Internet, New Media and the implications of HMP on the Fairness Doctrine
A Fairness Doctrine revival may not only repeat these problems, but could
very well produce a magnified effect. Of course, the most obvious reason is the
existence of the Internet. Accessibility to public officials via the Internet has
led to the unavoidable reality of an information glut. Thus, a revival would
likely give rise to a significantly higher number of complaints. This will be
140 See Joseph Bafumi & Robert Y. Shapiro, A New Partisan Voter, 71 J. OF POL. 1 3-4
(2009) (describing how "partisan polarization" has strengthened in recent years after a
dealignment period in the late 1960's).
141 See discussion supra Part II.A and accompanying notes; see e.g., RonNell Anderson
Jones, Media Subpoenas: Impact, Perception, and Legal Protection in the Changing World
of American Journalism, 84 WASH. L. REv. 317, 334 (2009); Ellen P. Goodman, No Time
for Equal Time: A Comment on Professor Magarian's Substantive Media Regulation in
Three Dimensions, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 897 (2008).
142 See Gregory P. Magarian, Substantive Media Regulation in Three Dimensions, 76
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 845, 856-857 (describing the risk of government regulators influencing
media content to advance their own ideological biases).
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further amplified by HMP.
The changing landscape of the media also has implications for the Fairness
Doctrine and the hostile media perception. From the 1950s into the 1970s,
viewers had only three choices for news-the big three broadcasting compa-
nies-and the content for all three was fairly similar.143 Additionally, the
nightly newscasts, aired prior to popular programming, had a somewhat cap-
tive audience as Americans tuned in before their desired programming. The
lack of a remote control, coupled with the fact that all three stations tended to
broadcast their news simultaneously meant if one wanted to watch television it
was difficult to escape the news for a particular window of time every evening.
However, with the advent of cable and satellite television, and then the Inter-
net, the proliferation of choices meant Americans who did not have a strong
desire to be exposed to the news could avoid it. In fact, they did, resulting in a
news-watching audience that consisted mainly of news junkies, who tended to
be highly partisan.
Hence, the irony exists in today's media landscape that the very people for
whom the Fairness Doctrine might have its intended impact because they are
not as susceptible to HMP-non-partisans-are the very people who are tuning
out the news and would therefore not be exposed to the results on news pro-
gramming brought about by a restored Fairness Doctrine. Likewise, the very
people for whom the Fairness Doctrine would have little to no effect because
HMP causes these viewers to see unfairness even in "fair" content-strong
partisans-are the very people who are watching the news today and would
receive the "fair" news programming the Fairness Doctrine's implementation
would create. Only by erasing ideological reputations that media outlets have
acquired, which would reduce the potential for perceiving media bias due to
outlet labels, and forcing more of the American public to watch or listen to the
news, which would bring more non-partisans within the Fairness Doctrine's
reach, could an environment be created where the Fairness Doctrine may begin
to have its intended effect. Yet, it is unlikely that legislation could effectively
accomplish those two criteria, due to both practical and legal obstacles. Such
actions, however, would fail to address other causes of HMP and its continued
potential to undermine the Fairness Doctrine. To create an environment where
HMP does not exist would require altering the political ideology of Americans
so that all were moderates, and clearly legislation cannot practically or legally
bring about such a state.
Thus, the cost of implementing the Fairness Doctrine in the form of massive
bureaucratic expansion-including pricy legal battles-far outweighs whatever
143 See PRIOR, supra note 130, at 15-17.
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benefit might be derived, if any. The American public is not likely to notice
much of an effect from the regulatory intervention since they are likely to per-
ceive the new "fair" news as bias due to HMP or they may simply not watch
the news altogether. If the constitutional and logistical problems with the Fair-
ness Doctrine were not enough, the hostile media perception coupled with the
changed media environment should sound the death knell for the antiquated
idea that the government can make the news "fair."
V. CONCLUSION
The Fairness Doctrine was once an important and controversial regulatory
policy. Besieged by both constitutional and practical problems surrounding its
enforcement, it was discontinued after four decades. With the 2008 elections
placing Congress and the White House firmly in the hands of the Democratic
Party, discussion of its revival emerged in both public and media venues. The
political changes of fortune of the 2010 election and the emergence of compet-
ing crises such as health care, natural disasters and events in the Middle East
have, at least for the time being, somewhat muted this debate. Yet, other events
have not nullified the desire for its reinstatement by its proponents, and given
the cyclical nature of politics it is not conceivable that the political stars will
align again such that the possibility of its implementation becomes real and
popular. Thus, any future debate surrounding the pros and cons of a reborn
Fairness Doctrine must also take into account hostile media perception-the
phenomena wherein people highly involved in a position or group see even
neutral media content as biased against them.
HMP results in several potential problems that may undermine the effec-
tiveness of the Fairness Doctrine's re-implementation. First, HMP negates the
effect of forcing "fair" or balanced media content as many viewers will still see
media as unfair even with "fairness" regulated into coverage and program-
ming. Additionally, a proliferation of media choices brought about by satellite
and cable television, as well as the Internet, means fewer and fewer people will
be exposed to the impact of the Fairness Doctrine as they can escape broadcast
news and other programs that would come under the Fairness Doctrine's reach.
This would only leave news (and political) junkies who would be exposed to
Fairness Doctrine-regulated media content, and these are the very people most
susceptible to HMP. Furthermore, the increasingly polarized nature of the
American populace, combined with the technological ease of communication,
have the potential of creating a maelstrom of Fairness Doctrine complaints
unlike anything the FCC has ever before experienced. Finally, FCC staff and
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commissioners are also just as prone to HMP, which would lead to either bi-
ased decisions or a tentative agency that fails to enforce the Fairness Doctrine.
In the end, the view that "when Americans hear both sides of the story, they're
in a better position to make a decision"'" sounds good in theory but is naive in
the face of the psychological reality of HMP and audience behavior in the new
media landscape, making the cost of attempting to bring back and enforce the
Fairness Doctrine to far outweighs any benefits that may be gained in the 2 1st
century American media world, assuming of course, that the Fairness Doctrine
actually produces any tangible benefits.
14 Bolton, supra note 2 (quoting Senator Dick Durbin (D-Il1.) as saying "It's time to
reinstitute the Fairness Doctrine . . . I have this old-fashioned attitude that when Americans
hear both sides of the story, they're in a better position to make a decision.").
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